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Nearly three years after all three Baltic States regained their independence, Russia 
continues to infringe on their sovereignty, intervene in their internal affairs and subject 
them to coercive diplomacy. Russia's failure to complete the withdrawal of its troops 
from Estonia and Latvia, a long and varied series of incidents involving the Russian 
forces, and allegations that Estonia and Latvia have violated the human rights of their 
Russian-speaking population, are issues that have acquired a particularly menacing 
aspect in view of Russia's characterization of the Baltics as being within the "near 
abroad," not as independent and sovereign as other European states--and the recently 
formulated military doctrine and activist foreign policy that reflect a resurgent Russian 
imperialism. Since 1991, all these interrelated political problems have been at the center 
of Estonian, Latvian, and, in some respects, Lithuanian, security concerns and their 
deteriorating relationship with Russia.
 
Continued Russian Troop Presence
On 17 September 1991, the day of their admission to the United Nations, the Baltic 
States were still under "occupation" by another member-state--Russia. An estimated 
200,000 troops and support personnel of the Northwestern Group of Forces were 
stationed in the capital cities of the Baltic republics and in bases located throughout 
their territories. Russia refused to agree on a withdrawal deadline or on a redefined 
status of these forces. It was only under persistent Western pressure that Russia 
withdrew from Lithuania, where it had no significant bases (the only Soviet special 
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training camp for paratroopers was located near Kaunas), the last 2,500 troops leaving 
at the end of August 1993. Although the Russians began significant troop withdrawals 
from the other Baltic States in 1992, there remain an estimated 3,000 troops in Estonia 
and nearly 17,000 in Latvia.
Russia has been particularly intransigent over the ABM radar installation near Skundra 
in Latvia. While Western experts consider its equipment obsolete and its early-warning 
functions transferable to Russia's Mikachevo and Murmansk bases, (1) Russia has 
been insisting that it would not relinquish the base because of its strategic importance. 
Now the Clinton administration is urging Latvia to accept a plan, worked out in the 
course of Clinton's Moscow visit, that would allow Russia to maintain the radar base 
under civilian control for another four years with an additional 18-month dismantling 
period. As part of this plan, all Russian troops would be withdrawn from Latvia by the 
end of August 1994.(2)
The presence of Russian forces has been a chronic source of incidents, the more 
serious of which have involved violations of Baltic State sovereignty--deploying troops, 
staging maneuvers, transporting materiel and soldiers, etc., without permission from or 
advance notice to the host governments and often in violation of specific agreements. In 
the case of Lithuania, military transit incidents are likely to persist as long as Russia 
maintains armed forces in the neighboring Kaliningrad oblast' . At the same time, public 
demonstrations against the Russian military presence, such as Estonians picketing the 
Russian naval headquarters in Tallinn, are answered by formal Russian protests. The 
arrest of two Russian generals by a local Latvian official produced the most 
disproportionate response: a Russian military alert. The incidents and recriminations 
maintain a constant level of tension between the Russian forces and the governments 
and people of the Baltic States.
Exploitation of the Minority Issue
The most difficult issue facing Estonia and Latvia is posed by their large Russian 
population. There are two conflicting aspects to the problem: a) Russia's use of 
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unfounded allegations that Estonia and Latvia have violated the human rights of ethnic 
Russians--and lately of Russian-speakers-- as a means to re-establish and legitimize 
Russia's imperial dominance over the region, and b) Baltic determination to recover 
from the effects of 50 years of Soviet control, which was inextricably associated with the 
influx of Russians.
Russian allegations have been made in very general terms, usually citing unspecified 
"discrimination" and the denial of the right to vote or acquire citizenship without such 
requirements as a minimal knowledge of the indigenous national language and a pledge 
of loyalty to the host state. Russians not only have objected to these provisions, but 
have insisted on what is virtually a return to the status they enjoyed before Baltic 
independence: the acceptance of Russian as an official language on a par with 
Estonian or Latvian, higher education in Russian, and, ultimately, a restructuring of the 
state into a dual-community system . To bolster the validity of these demands, Russians 
use an inflated figure of 40 percent "Russian-speakers" in Estonia and Latvia, which 
includes the relatively small percentage of Ukrainians and Byelorussians, and 10 
percent "Russian-speakers" in Lithuania.(3)
To embarrass the Estonian and Latvian governments and undermine their legitimacy in 
the eyes of the international community as well as to justify its interventionist policies,
Russia has raised the human rights allegations in various international fora, notably in 
the United Nations and the CSCE, and in bilateral talks with Western leaders. President 
Boris Yel'tsin and Defense Minister Pavel Grachev have repeatedly linked Russian 
failure to complete troop withdrawals from Estonia and Latvia to an alleged need to 
protect Russians in the two states. Russia has also used the allegations in attempts to 
impede Baltic integration into Europe. On the eve of Estonia's admission to the Council 
of Europe, Russia objected to the admission on the grounds of Estonian human rights 
violations--the effort proved to be an embarrassing failure.(4)
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In spite of the fact that there has been no anti-Russian ethnic violence in Estonia or 
Latvia, Russia is claiming the role of "peacemaker" and protector of all "Russian-
speaking" people in the Baltic region. The history of such claims speaks for itself: Hitler 
vis-a-vis the Sudeten Germans, or Milosevic vis-a-vis the Serbs of Croatia and Bosnia-
Hercegovina. That the human rights issue is primarily a creature of Russian imperialist 
ambitions as well as a refusal by Russians in Estonia and Latvia to accept their new 
status as a minority and the concomitant reversal of their privileged status under the 
Soviet regime, becomes clear in light of impartial investigations. International human 
rights observers and several fact-finding missions, visiting at the invitation of the 
Estonian and Latvian governments--notably those led by Ibrahima Fall, the director of 
the United Nations Center of Human Rights, and Max von der Stoel, the CSCE High 
Commissioner for Ethnic Minorities--have found no systematic human rights violations 
in Estonia or Latvia.(5) However, the Scandinavian and other European governments 
have been urging the two countries, mainly out of concern about a possible Russian 
migrant influx into their countries, to adopt liberal citizenship and permanent residency 
laws.(6) The Clinton administration, as part of its policy of support for Yel'tsin, has taken 
a similar position.
For the Estonian and Latvian governments the issue of citizenship and permanent 
resident status, particularly for demobilized or retired military personnel, is politically 
difficult not only because of the strength of nationalist feeling in the wake of Soviet 
repression and Russification campaigns, but also because the high proportion of the 
Russian population is mainly the result of deliberate Soviet policies aimed at 
assimilating the Baltic peoples into the larger Slavic population of the Soviet Union. 
Russia's use of Russian minority related issues as a means to intervene in the internal 
affairs of the Baltic States greatly exacerbates the problem.
Lithuania successfully avoided confrontation with Russia over its relatively small 
Russian minority by granting residents of the republic automatic right to citizenship. 
Unlike the situation in Lithuania, where the Russian population is only 8 percent and is 
"balanced" by the same percentage of Poles, Russians in Estonia constitute 30 percent 
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of the population, with another 5 percent Ukrainians and Byelorussians, while they 
make up 32 percent of the population in Latvia, with an additional 8 percent Ukrainians 
and Byelorussians.' Estonian and Latvian fears of being culturally and linguistically--as 
well as economically and politically--overwhelmed by Russians stem not only from these 
high percentages, but also from the fact that the geographic concentration of the 
Russians makes them highly "visible" in these respects. In effect, it is not multi-ethnicity 
as such that has become problematic in Estonia and Latvia--both countries have an 
interwar history of model ethnic policies based on the principle of ethnic cultural 
autonomy(8)--but the historical context and present position of the Russian immigrants.
Forcible Demographic Change
Following their occupation of the Baltic States, the Soviets killed or deported hundreds 
of thousands of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians while thousands more fled into 
exile on the eve of Soviet reoccupation in 1944. The policy of locating major industrial 
plants in the Baltic republics led to an influx of large numbers of Russian, Ukrainian and 
Byelorussian laborers and managers. Aside from the occupying forces, communist party 
officials and KGB operatives also flooded into the republics. The mass deportations and 
industrialization policies resulted in a significant change in the relative proportion of 
Russians to Estonians and Latvians. Due to its high birth rate, however, Lithuania 
preserved its pre-war ethnic equilibrium.
In 1935 the population of Riga, Latvia's capital, was 63 percent Latvian; today it is only 
36 percent. In the country' s eight largest cities Latvians constitute considerably less 
than half the population; in the interwar period they comprised between 66 percent and 
95 percent of the population. Russians formed only 10 percent of Latvia's population 
before Soviet occupation, and only 8 percent of Estonia's population. Russians in 
Estonia today, aside from Tallinn where they constitute nearly half the city's population, 
are concentrated in the industrial northeastern region of the country adjacent to the 
Russian border. Not surprisingly they pose a significant threat to the territorial integrity 
of Estonia. In Narva, which is over 95 percent Russian, over 97 percent were reported 
to have voted for territorial autonomy. (The Estonian national court annulled the 
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referendum results.) It might be noted that Estonia is demanding the return of territories 
in the Leningrad and Pskov regions that were annexed by the Soviet Union in the 1940s 
and 1950s.
Aside from establishing closer links with the Nordic countries and Europe, mainly by 
joining various regional organizations as well as being included in NATO's "Partnership 
for Peace" program, in order to enhance their security in general, the Baltic States are 
seeking a specific remedy to pressures--European and American as well as Russian--
for the modification of their citizenship and permanent residency laws. They seek formal 
international recognition as Soviet occupied territories rather than as successor states 
of the Soviet Union.
This would bring about international recognition of Baltic claims that Soviet population 
transfers were violations of international law regarding occupied territories. As 
significant as such recognition would be, it would enhance Baltic security only if applied 
in a broader international context that would deny Russia's sphere-of-influence 
pretensions concerning the Baltic States.
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